


ALGERIAN CONFLICTS

by

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ALGERIAN CONFLICTS

PREMIER DE GAULLE'S ten-day campaign to mobilize support for the new French constitution in overseas France is scheduled to wind up in Algeria at the end of August. A month later, on Sept. 28, the people of France, at home and overseas, will go to the polls to cast ballots for or against adoption of the proposed basic law of the Fifth Republic.

The constitution as now drafted would give most of the overseas territories the right at a later time to choose whether (1) to continue in their present status of limited autonomy, (2) to accept full autonomy in a federation of France and overseas territories, or (3) to become departments of the republic.¹ None of these options² would necessarily be offered to Algeria, which is considered an integral part of metropolitan France; in fact, the draft constitution makes no special provision for Algeria, torn for nearly four years by rebellion against the authority of the mother country. However, intensive efforts are being made to win Algerian support for the constitution in the Sept. 28 referendum.

Observers conclude that the contest there is not primarily over the merits or demerits of that document. It is a battle between the French government and Algerian insurgents for support of the Moslem millions who make up the bulk of the territory's inhabitants. The French are striving to run up a large Moslem vote in favor of the constitution; the insurgents are working to persuade the Moslems to boycott the referendum altogether and thereby register their opposition to further French control and their back-

¹ Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion already have the status of overseas departments, with representation in the French parliament, and are not classified as overseas territories. Algeria and its departments, also represented in the parliament at Paris, occupy a special status of their own.

² A consultative constitutional committee to which the draft constitution was submitted recommended, Aug. 15, that overseas territories be allowed a fourth option: to assume their independence, at the end of five years, in a vaguely defined association of free states. After consideration of this and other recommendations of the consultative committee, the government will draw up the final draft of the constitution, to be made public Sept. 4.

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ing of the insurgent demand for independence. Thus, while the new constitution itself contributes nothing directly to settlement of the Algerian conflict, the outcome of the referendum campaign may have a good deal to do with the course de Gaulle takes when he comes to grips with the problem of Algeria's future relations with France.

ALGERIAN REBELLION AND VOTING PREPARATIONS

Leaders of Algeria's National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) have declared that they will not agree to a cease-fire at the time of the referendum. They are expected, on the contrary, to resort to terrorist tactics to discourage Moslems from voting. Wide native participation in the referendum in troubled areas, therefore, will depend on the ability of French military forces in Algeria to make it safe to go to the polls and to protect those who do go from possible later reprisals. Voting in rural areas is to be staggered over three days, Sept. 26-28, to facilitate protection of voters. Even in relatively peaceful parts of Algeria, French army personnel and equipment will be used to transport Moslem voters to the polling places from outlying areas.

The referendum confronts the authorities in Algeria with huge administrative problems. No general elections have been held there since 1951, no municipal elections since 1952. Voter rolls are out of date; Moslem women are being allowed to vote for the first time; and several thousand new communes have been formed since the last previous balloting. When the polls open, officials in charge will have to see that the army's influence stops outside the voting booth, that the ballots are honestly counted, and that announced results are grouped by sufficiently large areas to prevent F.L.N. raids on individual villages which may not vote to the liking of the rebels. The whole voting process is to be closely supervised by a series of control commissions created to insure that it is carried out in the freedom and secrecy insisted upon by de Gaulle.

De Gaulle promised Algerian Moslems, immediately after he came to power, that henceforth they would vote in a single electoral college with Algeria's European residents, so that the vote of one would count as much as that of another. If the French now can persuade the Moslems to vote in large numbers in the referendum, and convince them that their ballots will be counted as cast, then the

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way may be cleared for an Algerian settlement that will attract enough popular support to endure.

MOSLEM SUPPORT OF NORTH AFRICAN FEDERATION

The million Algerian residents of European origin strongly favor complete political integration of the area with France. They are believed to oppose any move toward a federal status in which they would be politically overwhelmed by the eight or nine million Moslems. De Gaulle, however, is thought to lean toward a federal solution of some kind, whether or not comparable to that to be offered by the new constitution to other overseas regions.

A type of federal solution unacceptable to De Gaulle has been proposed by Algeria's two neighboring states, Tunisia and Morocco. Government leaders from both countries met with Algerian insurgent leaders in Tunis, June 20, and agreed on new measures to "promote cooperation" and "help realize the union of the Arab Maghreb."³ They warned, however, that the "sole condition for a solution of the French-Algerian conflict" was recognition of "the irrevocable right of the Algerian people to sovereignty and independence."

Since Morocco and Tunisia gained independence from France in March 1956, they have been urging federal union of the territories which used to comprise French North Africa, with the possible addition of Libya. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba in October 1956 suggested formation of a "North African bloc which would be associated with France in a form still to be devised." Tunisia signed a friendship agreement with Libya in January 1957 which provided for increased cooperation between the two countries. King Mohammed V of Morocco declared, March 6, 1958, that he already foresaw creation of a North African federation.

The French so far have refused to consider any plan of this sort, for they deny the existence of an Algerian nation.⁴ They point out that Tunisia and Morocco retained their own governments under French protectorates, from 1881 and 1912, respectively, to 1956, while Algeria has been governed from Paris since its conquest in 1830.

Tunisians and Moroccans, rejecting the French thesis, see

³ Maghreb is the Arabic word for West and refers to the North African littoral as the western wing of the Arab world.

⁴ Herbert Luthy, "Algeria in Revolt," *Atlantic Monthly*, November 1956, p. 73.

in a Maghreb federation the best way to coordinate their own resources and at the same time maintain close economic relations with France. Such a federation, they feel, would give the slightly more experienced Moroccan and Tunisian officials opportunity to guide Algerian policy and so ward off possible overshadowing of their countries by a larger and richer Algeria.

Apprehension over the pan-Arab ambitions of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser is believed to be an important factor in the thinking of President Bourguiba of Tunisia. Nasser declared, July 22, in a speech celebrating the sixth anniversary of the overthrow of King Farouk, that "Just as Iraq has rid herself of traitors . . . Algeria too will triumph in the end." Because Nasser has supported Tunisian rivals of Bourguiba, the latter is eager to exclude the Egyptian's influence from the whole Maghreb.

French-Moslem Deadlock in Algeria

ALTHOUGH the Algerian question has been presented to the world, by the French government and by Algerian nationalists, as a political issue involving the relationship between Algeria and France, outside observers tend to see it differently. Herbert Luethy, a Swiss authority on French problems, has described French relations with Algeria in the following terms:

Argument about dependence on or independence of the home country is mere talk; it bypasses the real problem, which is that created by the third factor in the situation, namely the European settlers. All the present crises in North Africa spring, not from relations between France and her North African possessions, but from those between the local European population . . . and the indigenous population. . . . Fundamentally . . . [the problem] is that of the coexistence of a European minority, far superior in standard of living, economic power, and political development, and an indigenous population which outnumbers it ten to one and which is increasing rapidly.⁶

This situation, Luethy and many others have suggested, is not comparable to the American struggle for independence or to today's nationalist movements in Asia and the Near East. It more nearly resembles the racial problem

⁶ Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself* (1955), pp. 235-286.

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of the Union of South Africa, the only other part of Africa where large-scale European settlement has taken place. Metropolitan France has assumed the role of arbiter in the conflict between European settlers and native Algerians. French governments, on the whole, have protected the political supremacy of the European minority from encroachment by the Moslem majority.

SETTLERS' ADVOCACY OF INTEGRATION WITH FRANCE

European colonists (*colons*) in Algeria number around 1.2 million, including a Jewish community of around 140,000 members. Although citizens of France, about one-half of the settlers are of Italian or Spanish descent; the majority were born in Algeria. Inhabiting a narrow coastal strip about one-third the size of California, most of the *colons* are government officials, skilled workers, small tradesmen. Approximately one-third are farmers owning the most fertile, most easily irrigated lands. The average per capita income of the Europeans in Algeria is estimated at \$587 a year, of the Moslems only \$98.⁶

Political and economic power in Algeria is concentrated largely in the hands of no more than 300 big landowners and businessmen.⁷ Their influence has been decisive, not only in Algeria, but sometimes also in the National Assembly at Paris, where party divisions may give the Algerian deputies a balance of power. Supported by the other settlers, the leading Algerian landowners and businessmen have been the most vigorous supporters of the policy of integration and of the slogan "Algeria Is France." "For the *colons*, integration meant that the nine million Moslems would be imbedded one way or another among the 40 million French and thus made powerless; while they, the *colons*, would remain masters in Algeria."⁸

In this respect the thinking of *colons* is based on the fact that, under the highly centralized French system of government, departments (comparable in some ways to American states) are administered by professional civil servants with only limited assistance from elected councils. Political integration would make Algeria's governmental machinery more than ever dependent on the central gov-

⁶ M. M. Knight, "The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors," *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1956, pp. 359-360.

⁷ Alexander Werth, *Lost Statesman: the Strange Story of Mendes-France* (1958), pp. 324-327.

⁸ Sal Tas, "De Gaulle in Algeria," *New Leader*, June 16, 1958, p. 13.

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ernment in Paris, which, the *colons* assumed, would never sacrifice Christian interests to Moslem.

Many Frenchmen place a different interpretation on integration. In line with the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, they demand genuine assimilation of French and Moslem groups in Algeria through improvement of Moslem economic standards, provision of educational facilities for all Moslem children, and granting of equal political rights.⁹ Although this view of integration as essentially modernization gives special credit to the *colons* for the advances they have brought to Algeria, it aims to go further and ultimately provide Moslem Algerians with the same economic, social, and political rights as those of the Europeans. Toward this end, the French government since 1953 has spent about \$750 million on Algerian economic and social development.

De Gaulle, speaking in Algeria on July 3, sought to assure the territory of its "rightful share" in French progress. He outlined a plan to modernize Algerian agricultural techniques, irrigate additional land, double existing housing facilities, and expand schooling opportunities with the goal of making instruction available to all Moslem children within a decade. The government at Paris announced, Aug. 13, that it was doubling expenditures for school construction in Algeria and would increase the school operating budget every year for the next eight years.

Integration in the sense of assimilation has had the official support of the French army. Specialized administrative sections (S.A.S.) were set up within the army in September 1955 with instructions to renew French contacts with the Moslem population near the area of rebellion. More than 600 S.A.S. units were in existence by the end of 1957, operating schools, building roads, and providing medical care in a drive toward fraternization.

FACTORS FAVORING SPREAD OF NATIVE NATIONALISM

Outside observers tend to doubt that pursuit of the French mission of assimilation can accomplish in a few months what France has failed to achieve in a century. The Moslem religion and way of life have erected high barriers to French efforts. Islam has been described as a

⁹ Roger Vaurs, "The Role of France and the French in North Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1956, pp. 17-25.

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"granite block on which Europeanization beats as ineffectively as Christianity." ¹⁰ An American student of French North Africa likewise has declared that "It is the Islamic tradition that has thwarted the assimilation policy of the French and has furnished the bonds of religion, language, common historical tradition, which, together with shared experiences, provide the mortar with which nationalism has been built." ¹¹

Few of Algeria's Moslems, of mixed Berber and Arab descent, were French citizens until a decade ago. For a Moslem voluntarily to accept French citizenship would have meant renouncing his personal status under Koranic law. Another factor contributing to cultural dichotomy in Algeria is the position of Moslem women, who traditionally shun all contact with strangers and infidels. The French presence nevertheless has had a powerful influence on Algerian aims and ambitions. French-educated Moslems quickly perceived a difference between French theory and French practice in Algeria. The ideals of the French Revolution became the basis for their own demands for self-government.

Ferhat Abbas, first spokesman of the Algerian nationalist movement, sought from France, not independence, but greater political and economic benefits. As late as 1936 Abbas denied the existence of an Algerian nation and declared that Algerians should "link our future definitely to the French achievements in this country." ¹² His *Manifesto of the Algerian People*, issued in 1942, called for eventual establishment of a Franco-Algerian federation under which France would control Algerian defense and foreign policy but not the region's internal affairs. Abbas founded a political party, the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto, in 1943, but it was eventually outdistanced in popular support by the more extreme Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms, founded in 1946, which advocated complete independence.

Today the strongest advocates of Algerian independence are in the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), a loose association including moderate nationalists as well as pro-Nasser extremists. Although many F.L.N. supporters are

¹⁰ Herbert Luethy, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

¹¹ Benjamin Rivlin, "Cultural Conflict in French North Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1956, p. 5.

¹² Quoted by Ch.-Andre Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en Marche* (1952), pp. 110-111.

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undoubtedly held loyal to the rebel cause only by fear of terrorist reprisals, observers on the spot have pointed out that "The best educated and most successful Moslems lean decidedly toward the rebels."¹³ Ferhat Abbas announced his own adherence to the F.L.N. in the spring of 1956.

PRESENT ALGERIAN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON FRANCE

Although the political impact of French civilization has encouraged educated Moslem Algerians to seek independence, westernization has made the area more than ever economically dependent upon France. Under the ministrations of French medical and social services, the population has grown to such an extent that neither the agricultural produce nor the natural resources of the area are now sufficient to support more than one-third of its inhabitants.

A leading French anthropologist has pointed out that "As the people have been multiplying, their flocks and their farms have been expanding in production, and have reached the danger line beyond which the soil is irreparably exhausted, springs dry up, and forests vanish once and for all." The inevitable result of simultaneous growth of population and diminution of resources is "a constant, tragic, progressive, and inexorable fall in the standard of living."¹⁴ Migration of about 400,000 Algerian wage-earners to France has tended to check the pace of deterioration. Remittances they send home make up the equivalent of one-fifth of wages earned in Algeria. Many families there would suffer if independence limited work opportunities in France for Algerians.

Algerian trade is largely with the mother country; 78 per cent of the territory's exports went to France, and 79 per cent of its imports came from France, in 1956 and 1957. Algeria's own economy is seriously unbalanced. Two-thirds of the people depend for a living on agriculture and livestock-raising in a country which boasts barely one and one-half cultivated acres per person. French economic projects, such as road and harbor building, conservation and irrigation schemes, have been geared primarily to agricultural development; few local industries have been established.

¹³ Joseph Kraft, "We Are All Victims in Algeria," *New York Times Magazine*, May 25, 1958, p. 80.

¹⁴ Germaine Tillon, *Algeria: the Realities* (1958), pp. 19 and 28.

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At least half a million acres of the best Algerian land are devoted to vineyards, producing wine which the Moslem population is prohibited by the Koran from drinking. Almost all the wine, amounting to one-half of Algeria's total exports, is shipped to France, which has a surplus of home-grown vintages. "This precarious and basically undesirable process yields exchange in large amounts, very hard to replace. Such a subsidization of imports for consumption goods largely used by the privileged minority, paid for with a commodity needed by nobody and engrossing land badly needed for food production, does not make sense."¹⁵

POSSIBILITIES AND COMPLICATIONS IN OIL DISCOVERIES

Discovery of oil in the Sahara Desert early in 1956 raised hopes for more intensive economic development in Algeria. It also strengthened French determination to keep control of the area. Former Premier Guy Mollet predicted in March 1957 that in ten years Saharan oil could supply one-half of Europe's power needs. A Common Organization for the Regions of the Sahara was established in December 1956 and a separate ministry for the Algerian Sahara in June 1957.

Algerian nationalists are resolved that Saharan oil profits shall not be taken from Algeria. They hope to use the revenues for economic development. The first trainload of oil was brought from the Hassi Messaoud wells in mid-January 1958 under elaborate French security precautions. Now the French have moved to bypass areas of Algerian rebel concentration by constructing a pipeline from the Edjele oil fields through Tunisia to the Mediterranean coast. A French-Tunisian agreement, signed June 30, was denounced by the F.L.N. as playing into the hands of French colonialists. In the face of F.L.N. hostility and uncertain relations between France and Tunisia, most observers are convinced that effective oil operations in the Sahara will have to await an Algerian political settlement. A group of American, British, and French oil companies nevertheless announced plans, Aug. 5, to build a refinery near Algiers to process Sahara crude oil and promote Algerian industrialization. Construction of a large steel plant at Bone also is in the planning stage.

¹⁵ M. M. Knight, "The Algerian Revolt: Some Underlying Factors," *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1956, p. 363.

France and Algeria Since World War II

FRENCH CONTROL of Algeria goes back to 1830, when a French military expedition occupied Algiers. By subduing local chieftains and pirates, who were nominally under Ottoman suzerainty, the French gradually extended their holdings. The Mediterranean coastal area was organized into three departments—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—which were legally integrated with metropolitan France in 1848. The Southern Territories, a vast desert district which today makes up more than seven-eighths of Algeria, remained under military rule. The entire territory was administered by a governor-general responsible to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris.¹⁶

Resident Frenchmen, native Jews, and naturalized Europeans and Moslems in the three coastal departments were granted representation in the French Parliament, but Moslems were excluded unless willing to renounce their status under Islamic law. Moslem efforts to win a greater voice in Algerian affairs, begun after World War I, succeeded only in arousing *colon* fears. Violent demonstrations by the *colons* blocked Socialist Premier Léon Blum's 1936 proposal to widen Moslem suffrage. Nevertheless, the Algerian Peoples' Party—a nationalist movement founded by a native leader who advocated independence from France—became active in 1937. Although banned in 1939, it continued to operate underground while the Vichy regime controlled North Africa.¹⁷

Algerian nationalism gained new strength during World War II. Defeat of France undermined French prestige among the Moslems, and Allied declarations for self-determination of dependent peoples found a ready audience. The Free French colonial conference held at Brazzaville, Equatorial Africa, in February 1944, moreover, led to expectations that the French empire would be thoroughly reorganized after the war to give the people of the colonies equality and political responsibility.¹⁸

ALGERIA'S SPECIAL STATUS IN THE FRENCH UNION

The French Union, as set up by the constitution adopted

¹⁶ A fourth Algerian department (Bone) was created in 1955, and the four were subdivided in 1956 into 12 departments.

¹⁷ See "Nationalism in North Africa," *E.R.R.*, 1952 Vol. I, pp. 141-162.

¹⁸ See "Empire of France," *E.R.R.*, 1947 Vol. I, pp. 87-88.

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in 1946, provided for three different forms of relationship between France and overseas territories: (1) Overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, Reunion) administered as integral parts of metropolitan France; (2) associated states (as formerly Indochina) enjoying some degree of home rule while linked to France; and (3) colonies and trusteeships (as those in tropical Africa and elsewhere) to be administered by France until sufficiently developed for home rule.

Algeria's special status in the French Union was specifically delineated in an organic law of 1947. The statute treated all Algerian Moslems as French citizens regardless of their position under Koranic law. It created an Algerian Assembly, whose 120 seats were divided equally among representatives of the Moslem and of the European population, with the result that the Moslems were grossly under-represented and the Europeans grossly over-represented. One of the two separate electoral colleges was reserved for European and qualified Moslem voters, the other for the great majority of Moslem voters.

The assembly represented a concession to Algerian nationalists, and the dual-college voting system a concession to *colon* supremacy, but neither group was satisfied. In elections to the assembly in 1948 the Algerian nationalists won only 17 of the 60 Moslem seats. They, and many other

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observers, accused the French of rigging the elections. However, both Moslem parties were too divided among themselves to make an effective protest.

Anti-French outbreaks in Tunisia and Morocco in January 1953 spurred Algerian nationalists to renewed activity. A Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action, established at that time, consisted mainly of young men with military experience gained in the French army and with political demands formulated while imprisoned for nationalist agitation. Calling for national unity and independence, the committee launched a rebellion on Nov. 1, 1954. The F.L.N., its subsidiary, gradually received the support of activists in other Algerian parties.

PROPOSED REFORM MEASURES AND THE REBELLION

French efforts to suppress the Algerian revolt were handicapped from the start by pursuit of a contrary policy toward Tunisia and Morocco. Nationalists in the three Maghreb countries had agreed early in 1952 to coordinate their campaigns for independence, but France tried to combine conciliation in the two protectorates with repression in Algeria. French Premier Pierre Mendes-France agreed in July 1954 to grant internal autonomy to Tunisia; his successor, Premier Edgar Faure, made a similar commitment to Morocco in November 1955. Yet Faure's government refused to negotiate with the F.L.N. in Algeria, denounced it as a band of terrorists, and began shifting NATO units to Algeria to put down the Algerian revolt.

At the same time, the government at Paris proposed to alleviate some of the Moslem grievances through political and economic reorganization. Jacques Soustelle, Governor-General of Algeria, proposed an extensive land reform, greater local autonomy, and equal economic opportunities for Europeans and Moslems within the framework of integration with France. Approved by the French Assembly, Soustelle's proposals were rejected by *colon* and Moslem alike.

Faure's successor, Socialist Premier Guy Mollet, appointed a well-known liberal, Gen. Georges Catroux, as resident minister in Algeria. On a visit to Algeria in February 1956, Mollet offered free elections on the basis of Moslem equality for a representative Algerian government. But violent and hostile demonstrations by the *colons* led

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Mollet to modify his program and Catroux to offer his resignation. Robert Lacoste was appointed resident minister in Catroux's place. Mollet offered the rebels a choice, Feb. 28, 1956, between a cease-fire (to be followed by elections in three months and negotiations on home rule) and an all-out military campaign. When the rebels rejected French terms because they did not trust either their own political strength or French promises, the National Assembly dissolved the Algerian Assembly and gave Lacoste full powers to put down the revolt.

Despite French hopes that pacification would be complete by the autumn of 1956, the war has continued. French negotiation of full Moroccan and Tunisian independence in March 1956 provided the Algerians with new incentives and—more important—with friendly territories on which to base military operations. French offers of increased Moslem political and economic participation in the government of Algeria were met by F.L.N. refusal to negotiate without a definite guarantee that independence would be granted.

A new French *loi-cadre* or framework law for Algeria was accepted by the French National Assembly in November 1957. It provided that Algeria was to remain an integral part of France but as a federation of autonomous territories with elected local assemblies and responsible governments. Moslems and Europeans both were to enjoy universal suffrage in a single electoral college. The French government was to retain jurisdiction over external affairs, defense, electoral systems, currency, civil and penal law, customs and taxes, justice, public education, civil service, and state-owned businesses.

Colons, Moslems, and other observers were highly critical of the law's provisions. "Even supposing that it ever be seriously applied," the *Atlantic Monthly* noted, "it is so self-contradictory and ambiguous in its phrasing that it can hardly do more than eternalize the status quo."¹⁹ Continuance of disturbed conditions has left the law in suspension up to now.

RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH ALGERIA'S NEIGHBORS

Despite French insistence that the Algerian revolt is a matter of only domestic concern, the prolonged hostilities

¹⁹ "Report on France," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1958, p. 16.

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have convinced Tunisian and Moroccan leaders that Algeria cannot be treated apart from the remainder of North Africa. Throughout 1956 Tunisian Premier Habib Bourguiba and Moroccan Sultan Mohammed V tried to mediate between France and the F.L.N. Bourguiba hoped to win F.L.N. agreement to a compromise plan for internal autonomy in Algeria as a first step toward independence. The negotiations were interrupted in October 1956 when the French army engineered the arrest of five Algerian nationalist leaders who were flying from Rabat to Tunis to discuss mediation possibilities. Anti-French demonstrations followed in Morocco and Tunisia, and both countries withdrew their ambassadors from Paris.

The Tunisian and Moroccan governments made another mediation offer a year later. They proposed on Nov. 21, 1957, that Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia be joined in a North African federation closely linked to France, but French Premier Felix Gaillard rejected the proposal. To discourage Moroccan and Tunisian interference in Algeria, the French government has tried putting economic pressure on the two former protectorates, which still depend heavily on France for trade and aid. At the time they became independent, France agreed to assume responsibility for their economic development. Yet as has been noted:

Of promised French aid, amounting to some \$28,000,000 for Tunisia and somewhat more for Morocco, little has been delivered, and the constant threat of withdrawing it has been used as a means of obtaining political concessions. The political strings were obvious when France interrupted aid to Tunisia in May [1957], after Bourguiba refused to retract his statements that Algeria should become independent.²⁰

Continued efforts by the French military to put down the revolt have further dislocated relations between France and Algeria's neighbors. The French army has complained that Algerian rebels are equipped, armed, fed, and afforded sanctuary in Tunisia and Morocco. Tunisians and Moroccans have made no secret of their full support of Algerian independence and of their hostility to the French armed forces.

Bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef by French planes last February brought friction with the military to a head. The French cited the legal doctrine of

²⁰ Lorna Hahn, "Last Chance in North Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1958, p. 312.

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hot pursuit to justify military operations beyond the Algerian border, but Tunisians viewed the attack as a deliberate violation of their independent status. Many Tunisians and some outsiders feared that if the French army remained in Algeria, it would try to reconquer both Tunisia and Morocco.

Tunisian relations with France have improved since de Gaulle agreed on June 17 to evacuate all French armed forces which had been allowed to remain in Tunisia after the country gained its independence, with the exception of units stationed at the Bizerte naval base. The Moroccan government is still calling for withdrawal of French and of Spanish troops posted on its territory; nationalists are pressing at the same time for American withdrawal from the four U.S. Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco.²¹

American Policy Toward North Africa

THE UNITED STATES has been concerned with French policies in North Africa since before American forces made wartime landings there in November 1942. President Roosevelt shocked French officials by inviting the nationalist Sultan of Morocco to dinner during the Casablanca conference in January 1943, a move interpreted by many Moslems as direct encouragement of their aspirations for independence.

In the 1952-56 conflict between France and the protectorates, the United States professed neutrality, yet continued to back France as a NATO ally whose support in the defense of Europe was vital. As one writer has suggested in relation to the Moroccan struggle for independence, "Caught between the rising tide of Moroccan nationalism and a close alliance with France, American policy was dominated more and more by the dilemma of deciding whom to displease the less, the French or the Moslems."²²

The United States has consistently sided with France

²¹ At French insistence, U.S. negotiations for the Moroccan bases were conducted with the French, not the Moroccan, government in 1950-51. Negotiations for a new base agreement directly with Morocco, begun last May, have so far been inconclusive.

²² John A. Marcum, "The United States and Morocco," *Middle East Affairs*, January 1957, p. 7.

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in the United Nations. When 14 Afro-Asian nations brought the question of French repressive measures in Algeria before the General Assembly in September 1955, the United States voted against U.N. consideration of the issue on the ground that it was essentially within French domestic jurisdiction. When the matter was nevertheless put on the agenda, the French walked out and did not return until the question was dropped nearly eight weeks later.

C. Douglas Dillon, then U.S. ambassador to France, sought to allay French doubts about this country's position on Algeria by declaring, March 20, 1956, that "The United States stands solidly behind France in her search for a liberal and equitable solution of the problems in Algeria." This statement was interpreted as conveying not so much approval of French actions in Algeria as recognition that the solution must be worked out by France and that France was to be encouraged, not antagonized, in that effort.

The question came before the United Nations again in June 1956, when a group of Afro-Asian nations called for a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the greatly intensified conflict. The Security Council rejected the appeal by a 7-2 vote; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative at the United Nations, explained, June 26, that the United States had "concluded that consideration by the Security Council of this situation at this time would not contribute to a solution."

In February 1957 Lodge praised the French government's decision to discuss its plans for Algeria in the General Assembly, and he opposed a resolution mentioning the Algerian people's "fundamental right of self-determination." U.N. members voted unanimously in the General Assembly, Dec. 10, 1957, for a compromise resolution. The resolution noted mediation offers by the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia²³ and expressed the wish that "pourparlers will be entered into and other means utilized, with a view to a solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

Despite continued diplomatic support of France, U.S. policymakers are becoming increasingly worried about the

²³ Premier Bourguiba became President of Tunisia when the Bey of Tunis was deposed, and the country proclaimed a republic, in July 1957; the Sultan of Morocco became the King of Morocco in August 1957.

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Algerian situation. By transferring four of the five French NATO divisions from Europe to Algeria, the French government has seriously weakened European defenses against the Soviet military threat. At the same time, French use of U.S.-manufactured weapons has fed anti-Americanism in North Africa. The Algerian departments of France are specifically included in the area to be defended by NATO, but, in the words of one critical writer, "Is NATO designed to defend the Atlantic area against Russia or is it to be used at the same time to defend territories outside Europe against nationalist movements for independence?"²⁴

CONCERN FOR GOOD WILL OF TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

Many observers are concerned about the effect of U.S. actions on newly independent Tunisia and Morocco. Tunisian President Bourguiba is widely regarded as one of the most constructive, most popular, and most pro-Western of all Arab leaders. King Mohammed of Morocco is believed to favor close ties with the West, whereas most of the leaders of the powerful Istiqlal party in that country have demanded a neutralist policy modeled on that of President Nasser. Against this background, continued French fighting in Algeria and continued American support of France is believed to strengthen extreme, Cairo-influenced nationalist groups at the expense of more moderate political opinion.

In a vigorous arraignment of United States policy, July 2, 1957, Sen. John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.) warned the Senate that "Instead of abandoning African nationalism to the anti-Western agitators and Soviet agents who hope to capture its leadership, the United States, a product of political revolution, must redouble its efforts to earn the respect and friendship of nationalist leaders." Kennedy offered a formal resolution urging the administration "to place the influence of the United States behind efforts, either through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or good offices of the Prime Minister of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco, to achieve a solution which will recognize the independent personality of Algeria and establish the basis for a settlement interdependent with France and neighboring nations."

Kennedy's proposal was criticized by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and also by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson as "injudicious." However, the United States

²⁴ Vera M. Dean, "The Tragedy of Algeria," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Dec. 15, 1957, p. 58.

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in November 1957 indicated the high value it attached to Tunisian good will by joining Great Britain in shipping small arms and ammunition to that country. The French government, which was not forewarned, had insisted that Tunisia buy arms only from France but had refused to make deliveries without guarantees that the arms would not be allowed to fall into Algerian rebel hands.

Sharp French protests did not weaken American or British insistence that Tunisia as a sovereign nation had the right to procure weapons where it chose. However, when the United States and Great Britain agreed in mid-August 1958 to ship more ammunition, and replacements and spare parts for the rifles and machine guns delivered last year, the French government was informed in advance and offered no objections. By now relations between Tunisia and the Algerian rebels seemed to be cooling and there were reports that the 6,000-man Tunisian army might be doubled or tripled as a safeguard against pressure from the large Algerian rebel forces.

When Bourguiba called last February for a U.N. Security Council meeting to consider the French "act of aggression" in bombing Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, the United States and Great Britain offered their good offices. A mission composed of U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and British Assistant Under Secretary Harold Beeley tried to effect a compromise between Tunisian demands for withdrawal of French troops and French insistence that Tunisians close their frontiers to rebel forces. The mediation, and subsequent direct French negotiations with Bourguiba, had come to naught when Premier Gaillard's government was voted out of office on April 16, but an agreement for troop withdrawal was concluded shortly after de Gaulle took office.

France, Great Britain, and the United States have pinned their hopes for an Algerian settlement on de Gaulle since he came to power on June 1. The vote of the people of Algeria in the coming constitutional referendum may afford clues to the extent of support among them for a continuing close relationship with France and the present strength of sentiment for complete independence.

